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ABSTRACT
This paper is an attempt to analyze how the Dutch shipping and trade system reacted to the profound 
changes that occurred in Dutch-Russian trade relations in the first two decades of  the eighteenth 
century. It will be substantiated that the changes that occurred had complex underlying causes: it is in 
fact the combination of  far-reaching protectionist measures aimed at the polarization of  St. Petersburg, 
changes in product demand in the Netherlands and the weakened position of  Dutch maritime shipping 
as opposed to its direct competitors (primarily English shipping). In this paper, the primary focus will 
be on the effects of  the polarization of  St. Petersburg. It will be argued that Czar Peter the Great's 
foreign and domestic economic policies led to the emergence of  new routines, the abandonment of  the 
traditional Archangel route, growing interference between nearby destinations in the eastern part of  the 
Gulf  of  Finland and operational efficiency gains in goods transportation to and from Russia. The 
paper challenges the traditional view of  maritime shipping as a spin-off  effect of  trade and embraces a 
more comprehensive analytical point of  view that has its foundations in evolutionary economic theory. 
2INTRODUCTION
In the beginning of  the eighteenth century, the existing organizational structure of  Dutch maritime 
shipping in the Gulf  of  Finland and Archangel  suffered from disorder.  The political  changes that 
succeeded each other at great pace in the opening years of  the eighteenth century caused a shock for 
Dutch shipping and trade with Russia.
The disturbances of  war in the Baltic Sea eventually led to a near monopoly position of  Archangel in 
Dutch-Russian trade in the years 1700-1717. This near monopoly found expression in a continuous 
positive trend in the number of  Dutch ship masters that realized return journeys to Russia’s White Sea 
port1. Initially, Peter the Great’s attempts to promote trade through St. Petersburg instead of  Archangel 
seemed to have had little effect. Only in 1717, a transformation started to take shape. Novgorodian and 
Pskovian merchants, who back in 1701 were forced to redirect their good streams to Archangel2, would 
play a decisive role in this transformation.
This paper is an attempt to analyze how the Dutch shipping and trade system reacted to the profound 
changes  that  occurred in  Dutch-Russian trade relations in  the first  two decades of  the  eighteenth 
century.  In the first paragraph, I will outline Peter the Great's foreign and domestic economic policies 
insofar as they had an impact on shipping and trade. In the second paragraph, changes in the Dutch-
Russian trade system in the first decades of  the eighteenth century will be addressed briefly. The third 
paragraph contains the analysis of  the changing structure of  Dutch maritime shipping to Russia in the 
first  decades  of  the  eighteenth  century.  The  analytical  focus  will  be  on  the  years  1718-1724,  i.e. 
following the end of  Archangel's monopoly in Dutch-Russian shipping and trade. The third paragraph 
will cover the abandonment of  the Archangel route, the emergence of  growing interference between 
populations of  ship masters active of  different routes, and the development of  a new routine on the St. 
Petersburg route. Conclusions will complete the paper.
I. RUSSIA'S DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY MEASURES
1. Economic policy in a time of  war, 1709-1717
In 1709, the defeat of  the Swedes at Poltava, heralded a new episode in the ongoing Russo-Swedish 
war. The Russian Empire started to play the upper hand and managed to consolidate its  positions 
around the Baltic Sea. In 1703, the Swedish town Nyen, located in the Neva Estuary, was conquered 
and demolished. St. Petersburg was founded a few miles further down the Neva, even closer to the 
Gulf  of  Finland. In 1704, Narva came under Russian rule. In 1710, Riga and Vyborg were conquered; 
the Swedes were drawn back from the eastern shores of  the Baltic. Almost immediately following the 
Battle  of  Poltava,  a  number  of  economic-political,  administrative  and  infrastructural  reforms  was 
introduced  at  great  pace.  Most  significant  were  the  foundation  of  the  Senate  in  1711  and  the 
declaration of  St. Petersburg as the Russian Empire's new capital in 17123. The Russian Empire's center 
of  power clearly moved towards the Neva estuary. 
The Russian Empire's economic policies were directed towards the role of  Archangel as opposed to St. 
Petersburg. As a direct consequence of  continuous warfare in the Baltic4, trade at Archangel flourished 
1 Werner Scheltjens, De invloed van ruimtelijke verandering op operationele strategieën in de vroeg-moderne 
Nederlandse scheepvaart: een case-study over de Nederlandse scheepvaart in de Finse Golf en op Archangel, 1703-
1740, Groningen: Barkhuis Publishing, 2009, pp. 111-131.
2 Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossijskoj Imperii (abbreviated as PSZ). Pervaja Serija s 1649 po 12 dekabrja 1825 goda 
(sost. pod rukovodstvom M.M. Speranskogo). Sanktpeterburg: [s.n.], 1830, 45 vol,vol.  IV, nr. 2387; N.N Repin, 
‘Izmenenie ob’’ema i struktury ėksporta Archangel’skogo i Peterburgskogo portov v pervoj polovine XVIII v.’ // 
Promyšlennost’ i torgovlja Rossii XVII-XVIII vv.: sbornik statej, Moskva: Nauka, 1983, p. 178.
3 P.N. Petrov, Istorija Sankt-Peterburga s osnovija goroda do vvedenija v dejstvie vybornago gorodskago upravlenija  
po učreždenijam o gubernijach 1703-1782. Sankt-Peterburg, Tipografija Glazunova, 1885., p. 57.
4 J.W. Veluwenkamp, Archangel: Nederlandse Ondernemers in Rusland 1550-1785, Amsterdam, Balans, 2000.; N.N. 
Repin, ‘Ot diskriminacii k fritrederstvu: pravitel’stvennaja reglamentacija torgovli čerez Archangel’sk v 20-60-e 
3like never before in its history. The annual turnover at Archangel rose from 1,5 million rubles in 1704 
to 2,3 million rubles in 17175. The number of  Dutch ships that called at the port of  Archangel would 
reach its “all-time-high” in 1716, when 89 Dutch ship masters were registered in Amsterdam to join the 
early and late convoys destined to Archangel6. However, already at the end of  1713, Archangel's fall 
would start. In November 1713, Czar Peter the Great issued a ukaz with a number of  policy changes to 
be effective in 1714. This ukaz would become the starting point of  a long series of  laws and regulations 
with the promotion of  St. Petersburg at the expense of  Archangel as their main topic7.
In the years 1714-1720, several attempts were made to limit exports from Archangel in favor of  St. 
Petersburg, while merchants in Narva retained their rights to carry out trade according to previous 
Swedish regulations until 17188. In 1714 it was determined that ¼ of  all iufti produced in Russia had to 
be transported to St. Petersburg, that merchants had the choice to export hemp from Archangel to St. 
Petersburg and that other exports had to be carried out via Archangel9. The same ukaz stated that in 
1715 equal quantities of  all  goods had to be exported from Archangel and St.  Petersburg10.  In the 
following years, the distribution of  goods between Archangel and St. Petersburg would be subject to 
continuous alterations, all of  them in favor of  St. Petersburg11. 
In November 1717,  Czar Peter  the Great published a new arrangement for 1718:  ⅔ of  all  goods 
destined  for  exportation  would  have  to  be  shipped via  St.  Petersburg  and only  ⅓ via  Archangel. 
Merchants from Novgorod and Pskov reacted to the new regulations with a request to allow them to 
abandon the Archangel route: because of  the proximity of  St. Petersburg, they no longer saw the need 
to use it. As this request answered perfectly to the wishes of  Peter the Great, it comes as no surprise 
that they were immediately granted permission. Merchants of  Kargopol' on the other hand, who – 
because of  the large distance to St. Petersburg – asked permission to continue sending their goods to 
Archangel, received a negative answer from the Senate12.
1718 would be the first year since the foundation of  St. Petersburg in which the number of  Dutch ship 
masters that appeared in the eastern part of  the Gulf  of  Finland would be greater than the number of  
Dutch ship masters active on the Archangel route. The hausse of  the Archangel route was over. Goods 
that, until then, would have to be shipped via Archangel, could now also be handled in the Russian 
ports of  the Baltic. Reorientation became inevitable for the Dutch ship masters active in the Archangel 
trade. 
gody XVIII v. i ee rezul’tat’ // Ju.N. Bespjatych (red.), Archangel’sk v XVIII veke / Arkhangelsk in the XVIII century, 
Sankt-Peterburg: Rossijsko-Baltijskij informacionnyj centr BLIC, 1997, pp. 228-249; Čulkov, Istoričeskoe opisanie 
rossijskoj kommercii pri vsech portach i granicach: Ot drevnich vremjan do nyne nastojaščago i vsech 
preimuščestvennych uzakonenij po onoj gosudarja imp. Petra Velikago i nyne blagopolučno carstvujuščej  
gosudaryni imp. Ekateriny Velikija, Sankt-Peterburg, Pri Imp. Akad. nauk, 1781-1788, 7 tomov, tom I, kn. 2, p. 107; 
Repin, ‘Izmenenie’, pp. 175-192; N.N. Repin, ‘Učastie kupečestva Evropejskogo Severa vo vnešnej torgovle čerez 
Archangel’sk v pervoj četverti XVIII veka’ // Materialy po istorii Evropejskogo Severa SSSR: Severnyj  
archeologičeskij sbornik, vyp. 3, Vologda, 1973, pp. 177-199. A survey of Russian exports from Archangel in the 
early eighteenth century can be found in  P. De Buck, ‘De Russische uitvoer uit Archangel naar Amsterdam in het 
begin van de achttiende eeuw (1703 en 1709)’ // Economisch- en Sociaal-Historisch Jaarboek, 1988, Vol. 51, pp. 
136-142. Dutch maritime shipping with Archangel is reflected in great detail in the so-called 'schipgeldregisters', 
which are part of the archive of the Directory Board of Muscovite Trade in Amsterdam. See: Stadsarchief 
Amsterdam (GAA), nr. 6: Archief van de Directie van de Moscovische Handel (DMH), inv.nr. 123.
5 Repin, 'Izmenenie', pp. 175-192; Repin, 'Ot diskriminacii k fritrederstvu', pp. 228-249.
6 See: 'schipgeldregisters': Stadsarchief Amsterdam (GAA), nr. 6: Archief van de Directie van de Moscovische Handel 
(DMH), inv.nr. 123.
7 Čulkov, Istoričeskoe opisanie rossijskoj kommercii, tom I, kn. 2, pp. 55-56.
8 Čulkov, Istoričeskoe opisanie rossijskoj kommercii, tom V, kn. 2, pp. 100-103; 109; 111-112.
9 Repin, ‘Izmenenie’, p. 181; Čulkov, Istoričeskoe opisanie rossijskoj kommercii, tom I, kn. 2, p. 46.
10 Repin, ‘Izmenenie’, p. 181; PSZ, V, Nr. 2784.
11 Čulkov, Istoričeskoe opisanie rossijskoj kommercii, tom I, kn. 2, p. 61; Repin, ‘Izmenenie’, p. 181; PSZ, V, Nr. 
3051, 3115, 3268.
12 N.N. Repin, ‘Ot diskriminacii k fritrederstvu', p. 231; Čulkov, Istoričeskoe opisanie rossijskoj kommercii, tom I, kn. 
2, p. 107.
4Illustration 1: Map of North-West Russia. Source: Jones, 'Getting the Goods', p. 48.
2. Economic policies before the Peace Treaty of  Nystadt, 1718-1721
From 1718 and until the introduction of  the new customs tariff  in 1724, trade regulations in  Narva 
underwent some fundamental changes, which without exception were inspired by Peter the Great’s wish 
to make St. Petersburg the Russian Empire’s main port. On the one hand, the growth of  trade via 
Narva continued to be a matter of  concern, but on the other hand, measures were taken to avoid trade 
in St. Petersburg to be disturbed by Narva13. 
In the period before the end of  the Great Northern War, i.e. until 1721, Russia's economic policy was 
marked by the continuing existence of  state monopolies in the export of  potash and tar and of  state 
regulations with regard to strategic products like grain and tobacco,  which were subject  to change 
depending on external circumstances14.  A 1718  ukaz stated that foreign merchants were obliged to 
import  flax,  hemp  and  iufti to  Narva,  while  they  also  had  to  make  their  ships  available  to  local 
merchants for the exportation of  goods abroad15. Importation of  salt was prohibited in 171916. Though 
these measures had the aim of  stimulating trade through Narva, they were largely overruled by the 
more profitable measures that  were applied to St.  Petersburg.  In 1720,  Russian merchants  sending 
goods coming from the Russian interior to St. Petersburg were to pay a 3% tax as opposed to 5% if  
they went elsewhere. If  the goods transported to St. Petersburg were exported, the Russian merchants 
13 Čulkov, Istoričeskoe opisanie rossijskoj kommercii, tom V, kn. 2, p. 132.
14 Čulkov, Istoričeskoe opisanie rossijskoj kommercii, tom I, kn. 2, p. 103.
15 Čulkov, Istoričeskoe opisanie rossijskoj kommercii, tom V, kn. 2, p. 117-118.
16 Čulkov, Istoričeskoe opisanie rossijskoj kommercii, tom V, kn. 2, p. 118. 
5were exempted from paying these 3% as well17. This measure clearly served a double goal: stimulating 
both the development of  a Russian merchant community and of  the port of  St. Petersburg, but it is 
only at the end of  1721, after having signed the Peace Treaty of  Nystadt, that more structural and 
efficient measures were taken to promote trade at St. Petersburg. A groundbreaking ukaz of  November 
26,  1721  literally  redesigned  the  hinterlands  of  the  Russian  ports  in  the  Baltic  and  the  port  of  
Archangel, creating considerable comparative advantages for the port of  St. Petersburg18. 
By that time, the increasing  attention that was paid to the establishment of  a Baltic fleet had already 
resulted in the foundation of  a number of  ship wharfs and additional industries (manufactures): ship 
building and timber production,  weaponry, metallurgy and iron industry,  and textile  industry19.  The 
stimulating effect of  these industries on Russian exports can hardly be underestimated. Even though 
the Great Northern War (1700-1721) surely had slowed down their development, the characteristics of  
exports from St. Petersburg and other Russian ports after 1721 can be explained by the early signs of  
industrialization observed throughout the first decade of  the eighteenth century. 
The  early  development  of  the  ship  building  industry  was  an  important  impulse  for  the  timber 
producing industry20. In addition to state-controlled ship building wharfs, a number of  regional centers 
for the production of  timber arose in the first decades of  the eighteenth century. In 1706, the first fine-
blade sawmill was put into use in the area around Archangel, soon followed by sawmills in Narva and in 
the surroundings of  Novgorod, along the Sias and near Vyšnij Voloček, both located along waterways 
that lead directly to St. Petersburg (see illustration 1)21. The iron industry, at that time organized and 
controlled by the government, developed quickly in the first decades of  the eighteenth century and was 
located in the Olonets Region (north of  Lake Onega) and in the Ural Mountains (see illustration 2)22. 
17 A. Semenov, Izuchenie istoricheskikh svedenii o rossiiskoy vneshney torgovle i promyshlennosti s poloviny XVII-go 
stoletiya po 1858 god 9 (reprint, 3 parts bound in 2 vols), Newtonville, Oriental Research Partners, 1977, I, pp. 56-
57.
18 PSZ, VI, Nr. 3860; Repin, ‘Ot diskriminacii k fritrederstvu’, p. 231; Čulkov, Istoričeskoe opisanie rossijskoj  
kommercii, tom I, kn. 2, pp. 103-105.
19 Ian M. Matley, ‘Defense Manufactures of St. Petersburg 1703-1730’ // Geographical Review, 1981, Vol. 71, Nr. 4, 
pp. 411-426; Arcadius Kahan, ‘Entrepreneurship in the Early Development of Iron Manufactories in Russia’ // 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 1962, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 395-422; Daniel Wallace, ‘Entrepreneurship 
and the Russian Textile Industry: From Peter the Great to Catherine the Great’ // Russian Review, 1995, Vol. 54, Nr. 
1, pp. 1-25.
20  Matley, ‘Defense Manufactures of St. Petersburg’, p. 415.
21  Matley, ‘Defense Manufactures of St. Petersburg’, p. 416.
22  Kahan, ‘Entrepreneurship in the Early Development of Iron Manufactories in Russia’, p. 401.
Illustration 2: Major metal foundries in the Russian interior. Source: Matley,  
'Defense manufactures'.
6Despite its  large distance to the  Baltic  front,  the production supplies  in  the Urals  appeared to be 
profitable and of  good quality. Problematic, however, was the large distance to St. Petersburg and the 
difficulties in transporting iron from the Urals to the Russian capital: originally there was no direct 
connection over water between the two regions. In 1703 and 1709, a canal was dug between the Tsna 
and the Tvertsa Rivers close to Vyšnij Voloček (see illustrations 1 and 2). From 1710 onwards, iron 
could  be  transported  over  water  to  St.  Petersburg,  though  even  then  transportation  was  time-
consuming (up to five months) and difficult (especially on Lake Ladoga)23.
3. Economic policies after the Peace Treaty of  Nystadt, 1721-1724
From 1721 onwards, only goods originating in Pskov and its district could be transported to Narva for 
export24.  Goods originating near Gžackaja Pristan’ and closer to Velikie Luki had to be sent to St. 
Petersburg instead of  Riga (see illustration 1); Riga’s hinterland (i.e. the geographical area from which 
goods  exported  a  certain  port  could  originate)  was  restricted  to  West-Russia  and  Ukraine25.  The 
hinterland of  Archangel was limited to the areas in the districts along the Northern Dvina that had an 
immediate connection with Archangel via this river26. Export goods that were transported previously to 
the Jug River or other rivers, or to Vologda via the winter route, now had to be transported to St. 
Petersburg instead. In 1722 merchants of  Pskov obtained the freedom to send their goods to Narva or 
St. Petersburg according to their needs27, which subjected Narva once more to severe competition from 
St. Petersburg. In the same year, Narva was put under the rule of  the governor of  St. Petersburg28 after 
which both St. Petersburg and Narva obtained a tax advantage of  2% and 1% respectively as opposed 
to other ports in the Baltic Sea29.
Next to this reshaping of  the hinterlands of  Russian ports in the Gulf  of  Finland and Archangel, from 
an administrative, institutional point of  view, the Instruction about the use of  forest resources (val’dmejsterskaja  
instrukcija) of  December 172330 and the customs tariff  of  172431 appeared to be of  major importance 
for the further development of  foreign trade with Russia in the eighteenth century. The Instruction about  
the use of  forest resources, the primary goal of  which was to secure the needs of  the Russian navy and of  
the “distant new capital of  the Russian Empire”, allowed to log timber along the Northern Dvina and 
its  adjacent  rivers  (i.e.  in  the  hinterland  of  Archangel)32.  Furthermore,  it  contained  a  number  of  
regulations that gave an impulse to the export of  timber products from the areas surrounding Lake 
Ladoga, Lake Il'men and its adjacent rivers33. Much to the discontent of  Novgorodian and Pskovian 
merchants34, in the Instruction about the use of  forest resources, extensive rights were granted to Russian and 
23  Matley, ‘Defense Manufactures of St. Petersburg’, pp. 420-423.
24 Čulkov, Istoričeskoe opisanie rossijskoj kommercii, tom V, kn. 2, p. 118.
25 Čulkov, Istoričeskoe opisanie rossijskoj kommercii, tom V, kn. 2, p. 174; Repin, ‘Ot diskriminacii k fritrederstvu’, p. 
231; PSZ, VI, Nr. 3860; Semenov, Izuchenie istoricheskikh svedenii, I, pp. 58-59.
26 The geographical location of the provinces is described as follows: “… Provincii, kotorye prilegli (…) k vodjanomu 
chodu Dviny bez perevolok zemleju [mijn cursivering]”. This literally means that no passages over land (barrages) 
were allowed during transportation of goods to Archangel.
27 Čulkov, Istoričeskoe opisanie rossijskoj kommercii, tom V, kn. 2, pp. 118-119.
28 Čulkov, Istoričeskoe opisanie rossijskoj kommercii, tom V, kn. 2, pp. 123-124.
29 Semenov, Izuchenie istoricheskikh svedenii, I, p. 58.
30 More information about the history of Russian forestry can be found in: V. Vrangel’, Istorija lesnogo 
zakonodatel’stva v Rossijskoj imperii s prisovokupleniem očerka istorii korabel’nych lesov Rossii, Sankt-Peterburg, 
1841; N.V. Šelgunov, Istorija lesnogo zakonodatel’stva, Sankt-Peterburg, 1857; Ė.G. Istomina, Lesosochranitel’naja 
politika v Rossii v XVIII – načale XX v.’ // Otečestvennaja istorija, 1995, Nr. 4.
31 ‘Tarif sanktpeterburgskogo, vyborgskogo, narvskogo, archangelogorodskogo, kol'skogo portov’ // Ukazy blažennye i  
večnodostojnye pamjati gosudarja imperatora Petra Velikogo samoderžca vserossijskogo. Sostojavšiesja s 1714, po 
končinu Ego Imperatorskogo Veličestva, Genvarja po 28 čislo, 1725 godu. Napečatany po ukazu vsepresvetlejšei  
deržavnejšei velikoi gosudaryni imperatricy Anny Ioannovny samoderžicy vserossijskoi. Sanktpeterburg: 
Imperatorskaja Akademija Nauk, 1739, pp. 47-81.
32  PSZ, nr. 4379; Čulkov, Istoričeskoe opisanie rossijskoj kommercii, tom I, kn. 2, pp. 106-107.
33  PSZ, nr. 4379.
34  Čulkov, Istoričeskoe opisanie rossijskoj kommercii, tom V, kn. 2, pp. 125-126.
7foreign merchants for logging masts along the Luga and Pljussa Rivers35. The differentiated customs 
tariff  introduced in 1724 applied to the import and export of  goods via St. Petersburg, Vyborg, Narva, 
Archangel and Kola36. According to the new tariff, on almost all exports from Archangel an additional 
levy of  25% applied, next to the 5% export duty that also applied to the exports from St. Petersburg 
and the other ports mentioned in the 1724 tariff  regulation37. With the customs tariff  being introduced, 
St. Petersburg’s exceptional position was strengthened once again.
Together  with  the  foundation  of  textile  manufactures  around  St.  Petersburg  and  the  further 
development of  the iron industry in the Ural Mountains38, the continued diffusion of  the Dutch fine-
blade sawmill technology in the eastern part of  the Gulf  of  Finland39 would have a major impact on 
the respective roles of  St. Petersburg, Archangel, Narva and Vyborg in Russia’s foreign trade. Narva 
and  Vyborg  became ports  for  the  exportation  of  timber40;  Archangel  became a  port  of  regional 
importance. St. Petersburg would become Russia's main gateway to Europe for exports of  valuable 
goods originating in the Russian interior, while it would also serve as the main gateway to the Russian 
interior for imports of  valuable goods from Europe and its colonies41.
4. Polarization
The  wide  variety  of  domestic  and  foreign  economic  policy  measures  described  in  the  previous 
paragraphs shared one common goal:  making St.  Petersburg a “New Amsterdam”. The cumulative 
effect of  these economic policy measures can be denoted as a process of  polarization that affected all 
possible geographical levels:  (1) the Russian Empire’s governmental structure, (2) distant regions in 
Russia’s interior, (3) the traditional centers of  trade Novgorod and Pskov and in a broader sense North-
West Russia as a whole and (4) the hinterlands of  ports in the eastern part of  the Gulf  of  Finland and 
of  the port of  Archangel.
Polarization  occurred  in  the  first  decades  of  the  eighteenth century  cannot  be  separated from two 
related motives: dominium maris baltici and nation building. Dominium maris baltici stands for domination in 
the  Baltic  Sea,  a  wish  that  occupied  many  of  the  powers  surrounding  the  Baltic  Sea  for  several 
centuries42. From the seventeenth century, when Sweden became a dominant power in the Baltic, the 
meaning of  dominium maris baltici became related to the expansion politics of  maritime powers43. It is in 
this same sense that Russia’s motivation to strive for dominium needs to be understood. Russia wanted to 
become a maritime power. The reforms that were necessary to achieve this goal, had a scope that went 
far beyond the political level. The establishment of  a Russian navy, merchant marine and a dedicated, 
self-conscious economic policy were indispensable ingredients of  the successful control of  the Baltic.
Nation building was the second key concept in the first decades of  the eighteenth century; it is a term 
that can have various meanings, depending on the angle chosen. In all cases, however,  nation building  
35  Čulkov, Istoričeskoe opisanie rossijskoj kommercii, tom V, kn. 2, p. 127.
36  ‘Tarif sanktpeterburgskogo, vyborgskogo, narvskogo, archangelogorodskogo, kol'skogo portov’ // Ukazy blažennye 
i večnodostojnye pamjati gosudarja imperatora Petra Velikogo samoderžca vserossijskogo. Sostojavšiesja s 1714, 
po končinu Ego Imperatorskogo Veličestva, Genvarja po 28 čislo, 1725 godu. Napečatany po ukazu vsepresvetlejšei  
deržavnejšei velikoi gosudaryni imperatricy Anny Ioannovny samoderžicy vserossijskoi. Sanktpeterburg: 
Imperatorskaja Akademija Nauk, 1739, pp. 47-81.
37  Repin, ‘Ot diskriminacii k fritrederstvu’, pp. 231-232; Čulkov, Istoričeskoe opisanie rossijskoj kommercii, tom I, 
kn. 2, pp. 108-109; tom V, kn. 2, pp. 129-132.
38 Matley, ‘Defense Manufactures’, pp. 418-423.
39 Sven-Erik Åström, From Tar to Timber: Studies in Northeast European Forest Exploitation and Foreign Trade 
1660-1860, Helsinki, Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 1988 (Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum 85). And also: 
S.-E. Åström, ‘Technology and Timber Exports from the Gulf of Finland 1661-1740’ // The Scandinavian Economic 
History Review, 1975, 23, 1-14.
40 Čulkov, Istoričeskoe opisanie rossijskoj kommercii, tom V, kn. 2, p. 118; 125.
41 Simon van Brakel, ‘Statistische en andere gegevens betreffende onzen handel en scheepvaart op Rusland gedurende 
de 18e eeuw’ // Bijdragen en mededeelingen van het historisch genootschap, 1913, Vol. 34.
42  Nikolaj Petersen, ‘Denmark as an International Actor 706-2006’ // World Political Science Review, 2006, Vol. 2, Nr. 
3, pp. 210-211.
43  Petersen, ‘Denmark as an International Actor’, p. 211.
8stands  for  a  whole  of  institutions,  rules  and  (power)  relations  that  manifests  itself  in  a  distinct 
territory44. The economic policy measures that Peter the Great implied upon the Russian Empire had a 
profound impact on Russia's economy and on all economic agents involved in it. The Dutch merchant 
community active in trade with Russia was no exception to this rule. 
II. CHANGES IN THE DUTCH-RUSSIAN TRADE SYSTEM
The far-reaching economic policy changes almost immediately affected the Russian economy. In a few 
years time, the Archangel's turnover dropped from 2,3 million rubles on annual average in the years 
1717-1719 to only 120.000 rubles in 1725. In the same period, the value of  exports via St. Petersburg 
exploded: from 233.000 rubles in 1718 to 2.035.200 rubles in 1725. 
year Archangel St. Petersburg Total
1704 1.581.400 - 1.581.400
1705 1.688.000 - 1.688.000
1706 1.207.400 - 1.207.400
1707 1.588.600 - 1.588.600
1708 1.558.900 - 1.558.900
1709 1.775.000 - 1.775.000
1710 1.792.900 - 1.792.900
1718 ? 233.000 ?
1717-171945 2.344.200 268.600 2.612.800
1720 1.445.500 ? ?
1723 294.000 ? ?
1725 120.200 2.035.200 2.155.400
1726 285.400 2.403.400 2.688.800
1739 326.900 2.247.300 2.574.200
1740 676.600 ? ?
1743 309.800 2.214.800 2.524.600
1744 273.700 3.717.400 3.991.100
1748 283.300 2.413.600 2.696.900
1749 339.800 3.910.000 4.249.800
1750 282.100 4.439.800 4.721.900
1751 421.000 3.510.000 3.931.000
1752 312.400 4.357.600 4.670.000
Table 1: Value of goods exported from Archangel and St. Petersburg in the first half of the 18th 
century46
In a number of  Dutch and Russian publications about Dutch merchants and merchant communities in 
Russia, detailed descriptions of  their activities and evaluations of  the position of  Dutch merchants in 
the  Russian trade system of  the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries  can be found47.  From these 
44  Jan Glete, ‘Cities, state formation and the protection of trade in Northern Europe, 1200-1700’ // Hanno Brand, Paul 
Holm, Leos Muller (eds.), The Dynamics of Economic Culture in the Northsea and Baltic Region (ca. 1200-1700), 
Hilversum: Verloren, 2007. Een bondige definitie is terug te vinden in: Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: 
Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century, [London]: Profile Books, [2005], p. xvii: “State-building 
is the creation of new government institutions and the strengthening of existing ones”.
45  Average per year (remark by Repin). See: Repin, ‘Izmenenie’, p. 177.
46 Repin, ‘Izmenenie',  pp. 175-192; Repin, ‘Ot diskriminacii k fritrederstvu', pp. 228-249.
47 Viktor Zacharov, Zapadnoevropejskie kupcy v rossijskoj torgovle XVIII veka, Moskva: Nauka, 2005, pp. 40-61; 250-
265; 662-663; J.W. Veluwenkamp, ‘The Purchase and Export of Russian Commodities in 1741 by Dutch Merchants 
Established at Archangel’ // C.M. Lesger, L. Noordegraaf (eds.), Entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship in early  
modern times: merchants and industrialists within the orbit of the Dutch staple market, Den Haag: Stichting 
Hollandse Historische Reeks, 1995, pp. 85-101; Viktor Zacharov, Zapadnoevropejskie kupcy v Rossii. Ėpocha Petra 
9works, it appears that the number of  Dutch merchants active in Russia in the first decades of  the 
eighteenth  century  was  limited,  but  nevertheless  important.  A  small  group  of  influential  Dutch 
merchant  families  had representatives  and/or  family  members  living in  strategic  Russian cities  like 
Archangel, Moscow, Vologda, Jaroslavl’ and others. Often, these families profited from their close ties 
with the Russian government, which resulted in privileges granted to them. The Dutch trade colony in 
Russia was linked to the rest of  Europe through similar family ties. The Dutch merchant community in 
Russia was specialized in “typically Russian” goods like skins, leather, caviar, potash, timber and the like.
Many  of  the  Dutch  merchants  in  St.  Petersburg  originally  started  their  “Russian”  businesses  in 
Archangel.  They had lived and worked there as long as Peter the Great's  economic policy did not 
disturb their activities48. The decline of  trade through Archangel immediately had its impact on the size 
of  the Dutch merchant community in St. Petersburg. From 1718 onwards, several Dutch merchants 
moved from Archangel to St. Petersburg, others would follow after the end of  the Great Northern 
War49. Unfortunately, no sources are available that could provide us with the necessary details to fully 
understand the relocation of  merchants from Archangel to St. Petersburg, but according to an analysis 
of  the  Dutch  historian  Jan  Willem Veluwenkamp,  at  least  16  out  of  43  merchants  that  signed  a 
cooperation agreement in St. Petersburg in 1722 had originally started their activities in Russian trade in 
Archangel50. 
Profound economic-policy changes, the speed and severity with which these changes were carried out 
and the comprehensive scope they had, inevitably had their consequences for the Dutch-Russian trade 
system. Around 1718, Narva, Vyborg and St. Petersburg had become accessible again to foreign ships. 
This, and the reorientation of  Russian commercial flows to the Gulf  of  Finland that started as early as 
1713 with legislative measures, increasingly showed its impact on Dutch trade with Russia. 
In the remainder of  this paper, I will examine how the Dutch maritime shipping community adapted to 
these new circumstances, thus implicitly adopting an analytical point of  view that allows for shipping 
and trade to be studied as independent and integral economic activities, each evolving according to 
their own rules. 
III. THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF DUTCH MARITIME SHIPPING TO RUSSIA
1. Introduction
Dutch shipping to Russia took a radically new form after the foundation of  St. Petersburg with its 
accompanying political, geographical and economic changes. The structural changes that occurred in 
the organization of  Dutch shipping with Russia in the first two decades following the foundation of  St. 
Petersburg  can  only  be  explained  as  the  interplay  of  a  number  of  parameters,  namely:  port  of  
destination, origin of  the ship master, cargo carried and size of  the ship. Though these parameters may 
seem very specific and straightforward at first, it is important to fully acknowledge the complex and 
dynamic  nature of  the  social,  economic,  political  and geographical  knowledge they  represent.  The 
individual ship master carrying these parameters is the primary unit of  analysis. He is the economic 
agent under study. The individual ship master is not a rational, profit-maximizing, all-knowing  homo 
oeconomicus. On the contrary: he is boundedly rational and risk limiting, and he has limited knowledge. 
I, Moskva: Rossijskaja političeskaja ėnciklopedija (ROSSPĖN) 1996, 346 pp.; V.N. Zacharov, ‘Inostrannye kupcy v 
Archangel’ske pri Petre I’ // Ju.N. Bespjatych (red.), Archangel’sk v XVIII veke, Sankt-Peterburg: BLIC, 1997, pp. 
181-227; Jan Willem Veluwenkamp, ‘Dutch merchants in St. Petersburg in the eighteenth century’ // Tijdschrift voor 
Skandinavistiek, 1995, vol. 16, pp. 235-291. J.W. Veluwenkamp, ‘De Nederlandse gereformeerde gemeente te 
Archangel in de achttiende eeuw’ // Nederlandsch Archief voor Kerkgeschiedenis, 1993, Vol. 73, Nr. 1, pp. 31-67; 
J.W. Veluwenkamp, ‘Familienetwerken binnen de Nederlandse koopliedengemeenschap’ // Bijdragen en 
Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, 1993, Vol. 108, afl. 4, pp. 655-672. 
48 Veluwenkamp, ‘Dutch Merchants in St. Petersburg’, p. 247.
49 Veluwenkamp, ‘The Purchase and Export’, pp. 86-87; Zacharov, 1985, p. 186; Knoppers, Dutch trade with Russia 
from the time of Peter I to Alexander I : a quantitative study in eighteenth century shipping. Montréal, ICES, 1976.  
3 vol., I, pp. 148; 151; 224.
50 Veluwenkamp, ‘Dutch merchants in St. Petersburg’, p. 243; Veluwenkamp, ‘Familienetwerken’, pp. 659-660.
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These characteristics of  the individual ship master are expressed in the four parameters introduced 
above.
The parameter 'homeport' helps to reveal what knowledge the ship master may have possessed that 
could help him to successfully carry out economic actions51. The parameter 'homeport' is closely related 
to the other three parameters. But whereas the 'homeport' of  the ship master is primarily associated 
with social and technical rules (or institutions and technologies)52, the parameters 'destination', 'cargo' 
and 'ship size' are linked directly with the ship master's operations and the behavioral and cognitive 
rules he applied in his economic activities53.  In a spatio-temporal framework, empirically established 
changes in 'destination', 'cargo' or 'ship size' reveal change in the behavioral and cognitive rules. Thus, 
these parameters are sufficient to examine change in the operational strategies of  Dutch maritime ship 
masters.  In  order  to  explain  these  changes  as  structural  or  non-structural,  population  analysis  is 
necessary.  Population  analysis  embraces  a  non-conventional  type  of  aggregation,  denoted  in 
evolutionary economics by the term mesoeconomics. The basic unit of  population analysis is the economic 
actor, who is free to choose and adopt from a variety of  habits and routines, thus giving shape to 
dynamic populations of  economic actors originating, adopting and retaining operational practices. What is 
crucial here is that the recurrent adoption of  a certain novelty by many individuals can be associated 
with  the  notion  of  institution  and,  thus,  with  the  existence  of  organizational  routines54.  For  an 
institution to remain effective, a regular supply of  new rule followers is necessary. When a certain routine 
does no longer attract new rule followers, it stagnates and will be left by its population next. The necessity 
of  “new supply” is therefore a key element in the analysis of  populations of  economic actors. 
Only analysis of  all four interrelated parameters, their evolution in time and space and the dynamics of  
their carrier populations can reveal how the structure of  Dutch shipping with Russia changed in the 
two decades following the foundation of  St. Petersburg.
Dependent on the relative weight of  either of  these parameters in the ship master’s individual decision 
making, a continuous trade-off  between cargoes and routes can be observed, resulting in a prevalence 
of  either flexibility or repetitiveness in the Dutch ship masters' operational strategies. A preliminary 
taxonomy of  the ship master’s preferences with regard to cargo and destination may look as follows:
Routes/cargoes Flexible Repetitive
Flexible Various cargoes, various routes Various cargoes, one route
Repetitive One cargo, various routes One cargo, one route
Table 2: trade-off between repetitiveness and flexibility in the choice of cargo and routes
The process of  adaptation started in 1718, when the newly conquered ports in the Baltic effectively 
reopened to foreign trade, and resulted in the establishment of  a new order as early as 1724. The seven-
year period between 1718 and 1724 was a period of  transformation, marked by recurrent changes in 
the relative position of  the various ports in this study as opposed to one another (see graph 1).
The main empirical features of  this process of  transformation were: (1) the rapid abandonment of  the 
51 In analytical terms, the parameter 'homeport' and the knowledge associated with it, unites 0th and 1st order object 
rules. 0th order rules are described by Dopfer and Potts as rules “(...) that concern such things as the role of the state 
in creating and implementing systemic rules, such as the rule of law, competition policy, monetary policy, property 
rights, and suchlike. They also concern the collective force of empathies, sympathies and cooperative trust extended 
as institutions in the form of behavioural and social rules”. 1st order rules are defined asgeneric rules originated, 
adopted and retained by carriers for operations”: See: Kurt Dopfer, Jason Potts; The General Theory of Economic 
Evolution, London and New York: Routledge, 2008, pp. 8-10.
52 Dopfer, Potts, The General Theory, pp.7-8. Object rules are “the class of rules for organizing things, including other 
people as the rule carriers (…)”. Object rules for organizing people are called social rules; object rules for 
organizing matter energy are called technical rules. 
53 Dopfer, Potts, The General Theory, pp.7-8. Subject rules “related to an individual agent and define the internal rules 
of the agent's mind [i.e. cognitive rules] and the outwardly directed rules of the agent's behaviour [i.e. behavioural 
rules]”.
54 Kurt Dopfer, ‘Evolutionary economics: a theoretical framework’ // K. Dopfer (ed.), The Evolutionary Foundations 
of Economics, Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 41-44.
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Archangel route by the majority of  Dutch ship masters; (2) the increasing number of  shifts of  the 
shipping population active on the Archangel route to the newly established populations active on the 
Narva and Vyborg routes; (3) the almost complete absence of  shifts from Archangel to St. Petersburg; 
(4) the immediate appearance of  a strong interference between the populations of  Dutch ship masters 
active on Narva and Vyborg routes. 
Graph 1: Annual number of Dutch ship masters in Narva, Archangel, Vyborg and St. Petersburg, 
1718-1724.
2. The abandonment of  the Archangel route
Analysis  of  the  population  of  Dutch  ship  masters  active  on  the  Archangel  route  (further:  the 
Archangel population) shows that there was a large degree of  continuity between the population of  the 
years 1697-1717 and that of  the years 1718-1724. This continuity abruptly came to an end in 1724. In 
the  following period 1725-1731,  only a  minority  of  less  than 30% of  all  Dutch ship masters  had 
previously been active on the Archangel route55. 96 of  the 110 members of  the Archangel population 
in 1718-1724 disappeared after 1724. 60 of  them had also been member of  the Archangel population 
in 1697-1717. The influence of  this fundamental change is reinforced by a general decrease in the size 
of  the Archangel population between 1718-1724 and 1725-1731 from 110 to 47 members56. 
The turnaround on the Archangelroute took place between 1718 and 1723. At least 10 ship masters 
executed their last voyage to Archangel each year, with a peak of  19 in 1723. 
55 Scheltjens, De invloed van ruimtelijke verandering, pp. 138-139.
56 Scheltjens, De invloed van ruimtelijke verandering, p. 139.
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Year Number of ship masters on last voyage to Archangel
1718 10
1719 11
1720 16
1721 14
1722 14
1723 19
1724 8
1726 1
1727 2
1728 1
1729 5
1730 5
1731 2
Table 2: Number of ship masters of last voyage to Archangel, 1718-1731.
When we concentrate further on the ship masters who executed their last return voyage to Archangel in 
the period 1718-1724, a structural spatial evolution can be identified. 
3. Shift from Archangel to Narva
33 Dutch ship masters shifted from participation on the Archangel route to participation on one of  the 
routes to the eastern part of  the Gulf  of  Finland. For seven of  them, this shift was a one-off  event, 
the other 26 would remain active in the eastern part of  the Gulf  of  Finland in second half  of  the 
1720s and sometimes up to the early 1730s. That almost  of  the Dutch ship masters formerly active⅓  
on the Archangel route would venture an attempt on the routes to the eastern part of  the Gulf  of  
Finland is striking; that this did not remain a one-off  event for the majority of  them is even more 
unexpected. But most striking is the fact that most ship masters that shifted from Archangel to the 
Gulf  of  Finland did not at all call at St. Petersburg, but appeared almost integrally on the Narva and/or 
Vyborg routes instead57. This fact clearly shows that trade and shipping followed distinct patterns and 
substantiates a claim to study maritime shipping as an integral economic activity that is marked not only 
by the nodes it connects nor by its own social structures exclusively, but by both elements at the same 
time.
While the diverse patterns of  shipping and trade express the individual complexity of  all economic 
actions, their explanation can be quite straightforward. Based on a comparison of  the average ship sizes 
in the ports of  St. Petersburg, Narva, Vyborg and Archangel58, it becomes clear that the ships on the 
Archangel route were probably too large to enter the port of  St. Petersburg. 
Archangel Narva Vyborg St. Petersburg
Number of ships 96 78 33 51
Average ship size (in last) 158 157 163 63
Table 3: Average ship size (measured in last) of Dutch ships active on the Archangel, Narva, Vyborg 
and St. Petersburg routes, 1718-1724. Source: galjootsgeldregisters.
57 Scheltjens, De invloed van ruimtelijke verandering, pp. 139-140.
58 This comparison is based on the so-called galjootsgeldregisters that are part of the archives of the Directory Board 
of Muscovite Shipping and Trade and the Directory Board of Baltic Shipping and Trade at Amsterdam. See: GAA, 
nr.6: DMH, inv.nr. 58-61 and GAA, nr. 78: Archive of the Directory Board of Baltic Shipping and Trade (DOH), inv. 
Nrs. 96-99. The ship size is measured in last, a complex early-modern measure that varied from place to place. In 
Amsterdam, where the ships were measured, one last accounted for approximately 2918 litres. See: Allen, Robert C. 
and Tommy E. Murphy [2005]; Just before the metre, the gram, the litre: Building a Rosetta Stone of Weights and 
Measures in the Early Modern World, Table VI, Version [05.08] 
(http://www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/users/murphy/measures/before_metre.htm).
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The ships which participated on the St.  Petersburg route in the period 1718-1724 were on average 
almost  100  lasts smaller  than  ships  on  the  Vyborg-,  Narva-  or  Archangel  route.  Although  this 
explanation seems very simple, it is an expression of  a complex interplay of  factors that influenced the 
direction of  these ship masters' activities. The size of  their ships is not an independent given; it is related 
to at least two other determinants of  the direction of  the ship master's activities: the cargo carried and 
the origin of  the ship master. 
4. A new route: smaller ships, different cargoes, different origins
Rivalry between the different possible destinations becomes apparent in the multiple route changes 
registered  for  the  Dutch  population  of  ship 
masters active in Narva, Vyborg, St. Petersburg 
and Archangel in the period 1718-172459. Some 
of  these  changes  would  have  a  temporary 
character,  while  others  would  be  permanent. 
Interference  existed  between  the  various 
populations  of  Dutch  ship  masters  active  in 
each of  the four ports of  this survey. For some 
populations, the number of  members that also 
participated on other routes was higher than for 
others.  Additionally,  significant  differences  in 
the  strength  of  the  interference  between 
populations of  ship masters could be observed. 
In  illustration  3,  interference  between 
populations of  ship masters is visualized.
The  number  of  Dutch  ship  masters  that  was 
active not only on the St. Petersburg route, but 
also in  one or more other ports in this survey 
was limited to 20 on a total of  129 population 
members. Compared to the participation on different routes of  46 of  the 103 ship masters of  the 
Vyborg population, 54 of  the 152 ship masters of  the Narva population and 27 of  the 108 Dutch ship 
masters on the Archangel route, the low degree of  interference of  the members of  the St. Petersburg 
population is striking.
Next to the average size of  the ships on the St. Petersburg route (see previous paragraph), additional 
information about the cargo carried and the homeport of  the ship master substantiate that the St. 
Petersburg population was a separate population with its own characteristics. The cargoes handled at St. 
Petersburg  (both imports  and exports)  differed completely  from the cargoes  that  entered and left 
Narva and Vyborg. The following graphs summarize the average tax that was paid on cargoes imported 
or exported from these three ports60. Not only does it immediately become clear that the average value 
of  imports (126,98 rdl) and exports (154,43 rdl) at St. Petersburg was significantly higher, it was also far 
less stable than the average value of  imports and exports at Narva (imports: 4,68 rdl; exports: 30,51 rdl) 
and  Vyborg  (imports:  20,43  rdl;  exports:  29,77  rdl),  which  can  be  related  to  the  large  variety  of  
products that entered and left St. Petersburg as opposed to the timber exports that dominated Narva 
and Vyborg. 
59 For details, see: Scheltjens, pp. 128-154.
60 The graphs are based on data collected from the Danish Sound Toll Registers for the years 1718-1740. These graphs 
were published earlier in: Scheltjens, De invloed van ruimtelijke verandering, pp. lxxxvii-lxxxix.
Illustration 3: Visual representation of the 
interference between populations of Dutch ship 
masters, 1718-1724
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Graph 2: Average custom value of exported cargo per ship. Source: Danish Sound Toll Registers.  
Value expressed in rikstaler.
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Graph 3: Average custom value of imported cargo per ship. Source: Danish Sound Toll Registers.  
Value expressed in rikstaler.
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The origin of  the Dutch ship masters that constituted the St. Petersburg population in 1718-1724 and 
beyond shows a similar discrepancy between Narva, Vyborg and Archangel on the one hand, and St. 
Petersburg on the other hand. In the following table, based on the galjootsgeldregisters of  Amsterdam, the 
origin of  the population members of  each of  the four ports in this survey is summarized for the period 
of  transformation (1718-1724) and the period of  new order (1725-1731). 
The dominant regions of  origin were Frisia and the Wadden Islands. Both are well-represented in all 
four populations. In the Narva and Vyborg populations, Frisian ship masters immediately obtained a 
dominant position, while the declining Archangel population shows an increased participation of  West-
Frisian ship masters. The St. Petersburg population also had a share of  Frisian ship masters and ship 
masters from the Wadden Islands, but they did not dominate shipping on this route in any way similar 
to  Narva  or  Vyborg.  On the  contrary,  ship  masters  from North-Holland  (i.e.  Amsterdam and its 
surroundings) gained a significantly stronger presence in the St. Petersburg population after 1724 than 
in the other populations. But neither did the St. Petersburg population.
Frisia Wadden Islands North-Holland West-Frisia # members61
Archangel62 1718-1724 32,6% 22,5% 21,6% 18,9% 227
1725-1731 10,5% 12,6% 8,4% 30,5% 95
Narva 1718-1724 76,4% 4,9% 11,1% 2,1% 144
1725-1731 63,2% 11,3% 9,6% 3,1% 737
St. Petersburg 1718-1724 32,9% 32,9% 25,7% 4,3% 70
1725-1731 20,4% 19,9% 27,3% 7,4% 216
Vyborg 1718-1724 83,7% 11,6% 2,4% 0,0% 43
1725-1731 56,4% 15,5% 9,1% 10,9% 110
Table 4: Origin of ship masters in the Archangel, Narva, Vyborg and St. Petersburg populations, 
1718-1724 and 1725-1731. Source: galjootsgeldregisters.
The St. Petersburg population seems to have been a population that constituted of  many 'incidental' 
participants, by which it is meant that these participants appeared on the St. Petersburg route when 
there were specific opportunities to seize. In this manner, the St. Petersburg population differed from 
the Narva and Vyborg populations that were dominated by specific groups of  ship masters with the 
same origin, that participated regularly on these routes. 
From the above, it appears logical to say that the divergent characteristics of  the parameters 'cargo', 
'ship size'  and 'homeport'  also found expression in  distinct  operational  strategies  employed by the 
members of  the St. Petersburg population. 
5. Growing interference and hierarchy
In the previous paragraph, the notion of  interference between populations had already been mentioned 
and visualized (see illustration 3). This interference was the strongest between (1) Archangel and Narva, 
(2)  Archangel  and  Vyborg,  and  (3)  Narva  and  Vyborg.  During  the  years  1718-1724,  interference 
between the different populations must be understood as the expression of  a learning process. In the 
years  after  1724,  the interference between the  Archangel  and Vyborg populations would disappear 
almost completely, while that between Narva and Vyborg would continue to be strong. Apparently, until 
1724, Vyborg had temporarily satisfied the needs of  Dutch ship masters who were formerly active on 
61 As registered in the galjootsgeldregisters.
62 Data about the homeports of Dutch ship masters active on the Archangel route in 1725-1731 is biased because of the 
exceptionally large number of ship masters for which no homeport is entered in the galjootsgeldregisters (33 out of 
95 registrations).
16
the Archangel route. In 1724, the shift from Archangel to the Gulf  of  Finland came to an end. The 
result of  the period of  learning and rivalry becomes clear through comparison of  the visualization of  
the interference in 1718-1724 (illustration 3) and that of  the years 1725-1731 (illustration 4 below). 
From 1724 onwards, a hierarchical relationship between Narva and Vyborg as possible destinations for 
ship  masters  with  similar  'homeport',  'cargo'  and  'ship  size'  can  be  discerned.  Vyborg  became  a 
secondary destination that satisfied the needs of  Dutch ship masters on the Narva route in case their 
demands were not met.
CONCLUSIONS
The new order that appeared after  1724 was marked by the absence of  significant changes in the 
participation rates of  Dutch ship masters on one or another route. The activities of  the Dutch shipping 
populations in the second half  of  the 1720s had the following characteristics: (1) in Archangel, a very 
small population of  Dutch ship masters continued its operations in a regular manner (flexible/repetitive  
pattern); (2) in Narva, a large, highly specialized population of  ship masters dominated timber exports 
(repetitive/repetitive pattern); (3) in Vyborg, a small population of  ship masters dominated timber exports 
(repetitive/repetitive pattern); (4) in Vyborg and in Archangel, an increasing part of  the Dutch shipping 
population interfered with that of  Narva, providing evidence of  a hierarchical relation in which Vyborg 
and Archangel welcomed Narva’s overhead (flexible/repetitive pattern); (5) in St. Petersburg, a far from 
stable population of  Dutch ship masters imported and exported valuable goods (flexible/flexible pattern). 
Specialization was apparent on various levels. The Archangel population was specialized in its specific 
route; the Narva and Vyborg populations were specialized in their routes and in the cargoes that they 
carried from these ports; the St. Petersburg population was – even though formally unstable – active on 
a route that was used for the import and export of  specific kinds of  goods that were valued highly at 
customs. 
From an operational point of  view, the result of  Czar Peter the Great's foreign and domestic economic 
policies can be described as the emergence of  two distinct operational strategies in Dutch shipping to 
Russia.  The first strategy has repetitiveness as its  main feature; the second one flexibility.  The first 
strategy applies primarily to Dutch shipping on the Narva route, and by extension to Dutch shipping 
on the Vyborg and Archangel routes. The repetitive nature of  this strategy can best be explained using 
the  parameters  identified  earlier.  The  second  strategy  applies  to  the  St.  Petersburg  population 
exclusively.  Like  the  repetitive  strategy,  the  emergence of  a  predominantly  flexible  strategy can be 
explained by the same interplay of  port of  destination, cargo carried, homeport of  the ship master and 
Illustration 4: Visual representation of interference 
between populations, 1725-1731.
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size of  the ship.  These two strategies would become the basis for the further development of  Dutch 
shipping to Russia in the rest of  the eighteenth century.
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